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On the divergence between the Transition and Green Wizards projects

Thu, 09/02/2010 - 21:28

John Michael Greer responds to a critique of his new appropriate technology movement, by Rob Hopkins of the Transition Town movement (see below):

1. Part One: excerpts from Greer:

“Since the Green Wizards project got under way two months ago, I’ve wondered off and on whether it would field any sort of response from the Transition movement. Thus it was not exactly a huge surprise to read Rob Hopkins’ blog post on the subject yesterday. I admit that the tone of his response took me aback, and so did the number of misrepresentations that found their way into it; I have no objection to criticism – quite the contrary, an idea that can’t stand up to honest criticism isn’t worth having in the first place – but it might have been helpful if Hopkins had taken the time to be sure the ideas he was criticizing were ones I’ve actually proposed.

When I sat down to start this week’s post this morning, I considered going through his comments one by one and correcting the misrepresentations, but what would be the point? Those who are minded to take his statements at face value will doubtless do so anyway; those who are interested in checking the facts can find my views detailed at quite some length in the series of posts beginning June 30 of this year. Instead, I think it’s more useful just now to talk about the things Hopkins’ critique got right. Rob Hopkins is a smart guy, and even though he’s garbled a fair number of the details, his post raises useful points regarding some of the core issues I’ve tried to bring up in the Green Wizards posts.

The first of those is that one of the motivations behind the Green Wizards project is a recognition of the limitations of the Transition Towns project. I’ve discussed my concerns about that movement on several occasions on this blog, and don’t see any need to repeat those comments just now. The crucial point, though, is one that Hopkins himself cheerfully admits: that neither he nor anyone else in the movement can be sure that it will accomplish what it’s trying to accomplish.

That’s a bold statement, and one that’s worthy of respect. Still, it has implications I’m not sure Hopkins has followed as far as they deserve. If the difficult future ahead of us can’t be known well enough to tell in advance what strategies will best deal with it, in particular, it seems to me that it’s a serious mistake to put all our eggs in one basket, whether it’s the one labeled “Transition” or any other.

This is the underlying strategy that guides the Green Wizards project. I’ve argued here that the best approach to an unpredictable future is dissensus: that is, the deliberate avoidance of consensus and the encouragement of divergent approaches to the problems we face. The Green Wizards project is one such divergent approach. It tries to address a broad range of possible futures with a flexible set of tools, but there are no guarantees; it’s entirely possible that the project will fail, or that the future will turn out to be so different from my expectations that it could never have succeeded at all.

That last comment could be said just as accurately of the Transition approach, and of course that’s exactly the point. Neither project offers an answer to all the challenges the future might dump on us, and neither one is guaranteed to work. This is why I’ve tried to craft the Green Wizards project to fill in some of the gaps the Transition Town movement fails to address. Does that make the two projects mutually exclusive? Not at all; it could as easily be argued that they’re complementary – though it also needs to be remembered that the two projects taken together don’t cover all the possibilities, either. Other projects will be needed to do that, and if we’re lucky, we’ll get them.

This leads to the second point that Rob Hopkins got absolutely right, which is that the Green Wizard project isn’t a solution to every problem the future has in store for us. I’m not at all sure where Hopkins got the idea that the project is predicated on an imminent fast collapse, which is very nearly the opposite of my views – the most popular of my peak oil books so far isn’t titled The Short Descent, you know – but he’s quite right to say that I consider peak oil, and more generally the impact of fossil fuel and resource depletion on an economy and society that depends on limitless growth, to be the core driving force of the next century or so of social crisis and disintegration.”

Part Two: Original Response from Rob Hopkins of the Transition Town movement

Excerpt:

“So, first question, what is a ‘green wizard’? Greer defines green wizards thus, “individuals who are willing to take on the responsibility to learn, practice and thoroughly master a set of unpopular but valuable skills – the skills of the old appropriate technology movement – and share them with their neighbours when the day comes that neighbours are willing to learn”. The idea, as I read it, is that any notion of a co-ordinated response, a la Heinberg’s ‘Powerdown’, a scenario where communities self-organise and work with, or without, their local authorities, to start the rebuilding of that settlement’s resilience, reduce its oil dependency and carbon footprint, is now for the bin, condemned as impractical and unrealistic. Greer appears to have given up any notion that such a thing might be possible, stating “a movement is a great thing if you want to hang out with congenial people and do interesting things together. It’s just not usually a good way to make change happen”.

Both Transition and green wizardry are based on the ideas that peak oil, and peak various other things too, will lead to a future of economic contraction and declining net energy availability, where the communities that are most successful are those that have most successfully strengthened and refocused their local economies in advance. Both (as I understand it) believe in the need for stronger local food networks, more back garden production, more local ownership of key utilities such as energy generation, and for a rediscovery of local building materials, seasonal foods and so on. Greer’s latest post, The Care and Feeding of Time Machines, is a fascinating distillation of useful tips and ideas around season extending, which will be of great interest and use to many involved in Transition. Much of the information being unearthed and rediscovered by the green wizards will be very useful for those involved practically in building resilience at a local level, and it is a very valuable and fascinating project. I do, however, have a few concerns about green wizardry.”

Do ‘Green Wizards’ build community resilience?

:This is the ultimate question for me. Would having green wizards in my community make it more resilient? I don’t think so. When talking about resilience, I mean the ability of my community to withstand shock from the outside, to not unravel at the first sign of difficulty, and to be able to reinvent itself, using the shock as an opportunity to reimagine and remake itself in a way more appropriate to a world of energy descent. For me, resilience refers to more than the ability to not fall apart when catastrophe strikes, rather resilience is a desirable state in itself, something to strive for because, if done properly, it stands a higher chance of meeting our needs in uncertain times than business-as-usual does.

My first point here is that there are already plenty of green wizards in my community, people with a range of skills. Transition’s working assumption has always been that we need a ‘Great Reskilling’, that we have become collectively vastly useless. However, the research I just completed that looked at Totnes found that actually people are far more skilled than we might give them credit for. The survey I conducted showed that 66% of people stated that they were ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ at food growing, and other methods such as focus groups confirmed this, that a lot more people are gardening than one might imagine. They learn not from government programmes, but largely from friends and neighbours, from people, like green wizards, who are just living it and doing it. The idea that we can build resilience by brushing up on canning techniques and swapping knitting techniques, while not wishing to dismiss the importance of those skills, is rather missing the point.

What green wizardry is definitely not, though, by any stretch of the imagination, is a response to climate change. Becoming a walking appropriate technology library is not going to do anything to reduce your community’s carbon emissions. Climate change doesn’t work like peak oil. It isn’t something that builds to one moment of collapse, a point where circumstances determine that suddenly people see that you were right all along. The need presented by climate change is to reduce emissions today, and to cut them as hard and as deep as possible. Our 1970s ‘how-to’ library has nothing to say in terms of measuring carbon, nor how to most effectively reduce it, producing nothing like Chris Goodall’s ‘How to Live a Low Carbon Life’.

Green wizardry also falls short because it fails to acknowledge that a transition on the scale it is presumably designed as a reponse to will be anything more than purely a challenge of an absence of practical know-how. Communities faced with the realities of energy descent, whether rapid onset, stepped descent or rapid unravelling will be faced with much more than simply a need for windmill designs and guides to making good compost. It is not purely an outer process, indeed the practical solutions side of it is the easier side. Ensuring clear communication, dealing with conflict, supporting people through the grief of the future not turning out in the way they had spent their lives so far imagining it would, is equally important. Are the green wizards also dusting off 1970’s self help manuals?”

Categories: News

Karl Hess on social technology

Thu, 09/02/2010 - 14:19

Technology is always social, and technologies that are participatory will follow distinct logics:

Categories: News

Steve Keen: Why the meltdown will last

Thu, 09/02/2010 - 13:49

private debt is far higher than Government debt, even after the increase last year due to Rudd’s stimulus package. Government debt is currently 5.5% of GDP, whereas private debt—even though it has fallen slightly due to business deleveraging—is over 150% of GDP: 27 times the size of Government debt. The so-called debate that the major parties are having over the size of Government debt is an embarrassment.

Australian economist Steve Keen has a very good explanation why our economic system is not able to jumpstart itself, it’s a must read to understand the fundamentals of this systemic shock.

The original article has many graphs.

Excerpts from Steve Keen:

1. The role of the level of debt and deleveraging:

“Debt reduction is now the real story of the American economy, just as real story behind the apparent free lunch of the last two decades was rising debt. The secret that has completely eluded Bernanke is that aggregate demand is the sum of GDP plus the change in debt. So when debt is rising demand exceeds what it could be on the basis of earned incomes alone, and when debt is falling the opposite happens.

I’ve been banging the drum on this for years now, but it’s a hard idea to communicate because it’s so alien to the way most economists (and many people) think. For a start, it involves a redefinition of aggregate demand. Most economists are conditioned to think of commodity markets and asset markets as two separate spheres, but my definition lumps them together: aggregate demand is the sum of expenditure on goods and services, PLUS the net amount of money spent buying assets (shares and property) on the secondary markets. This expenditure is financed by the sum of what we earn from productive activities (largely wages and profits) PLUS the change in our debt levels. So total demand in the economy is the sum of GDP plus the change in debt.

the GDP and the change in debt for the two years 2008 and 2010: in 2007-2008, GDP was $14.3 trillion while the change in private sector debt was $4 trillion, so aggregate private sector demand was $18.3 trillion. In calendar year 2009-10, GDP was $14.5 trillion, but the change in debt was minus $1.9 trillion, so that aggregate private sector demand was $12.6 trillion. The turnaround in two years in the change of debt has literally sucked almost $6 trillion out of the US economy.

That sucking sound will continue for many years, because the level of debt that was racked up under Bernanke’s watch, and that of his predecessor Alan Greenspan, was truly enormous. In the years from 1987, when Greenspan first rescued the financial system from its own follies, till 2009 when the US hit Peak Debt, the US private sector added $34 trillion in debt. Over the same period, the USA’s nominal GDP grew by a mere $9 trillion.

Ignoring this growth in debt—championing it even in the belief that the financial sector was being clever when in fact it was running a disguised Ponzi Scheme—was the greatest failing of the Federal Reserve and its many counterparts around the world.”

2. The ideological blinders of the neoliberal belief system:

“Though this might beggar belief, there is nothing sinister in Bernanke’s failure to realize this: it’s a failing that he shares in common with the vast majority of economists. His problem is the theory he learnt in high school and university that he thought was simply “economics”—as if it was the only way one could think about how the economy operated. In reality, it was “Neoclassical economics”, which is just one of the many schools of thought within economics. In the same way that Christianity is not the only religion in the world, there are other schools of thought in economics. And just as different religions have different beliefs, so too do schools of thought within economics—only economists tend to call their beliefs “assumptions” because this sounds more scientific than “beliefs”.

Let’s call a spade a spade: two of the key beliefs of the Neoclassical school of thought are now coming to haunt Bernanke—because they are false. These are that the economy is (almost) always in equilibrium, and that private debt doesn’t matter.

One of Bernanke’s predecessors who also once believed these two things was Irving Fisher, and just like Bernanke, he was originally utterly flummoxed when the US economy collapsed from prosperity to Depression back in 1930. But ultimately he came around to a different way of thinking that he christened “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions” (Fisher 1933).

You would think Bernanke, as the alleged expert on the Great Depression—after all, that’s one of the main reasons he got the job as Chairman of the Federal Reserve—had read Fisher’s papers. And you’d be right. But the problem is that he didn’t understand them—and here we come back to the belief problem. The Great Depression forced Fisher—who was also a Neoclassical economist—to realize that the belief that the economy was always in equilibrium was false. When Bernanke read Fisher, he completely failed to grasp this point. Just as a religious scholar from, for example, the Hindu tradition might completely miss the key points in the Christian Bible, Bernanke didn’t even register how important abandoning the belief in equilibrium was to Fisher.

We might not be in such a pickle now if economics had started to become more of a science and less of a religion by following Fisher’s lead, and abandoning key beliefs when reality made a mockery of them. But instead neoclassical economics completely rebuilt its belief system after the Great Depression, and here we are again, once more experiencing the disconnect between neoclassical beliefs and economic reality.”

3. The role of the banks and their unsustainable profit levels

“Because of that debt level, bank profits have gone through the roof as a share of GDP. Back before we had a financial crisis—when debt levels were far lower than today—so too were bank profits as a share of GDP. A sustainable level of bank profits appears to be about 1% of GDP. The blowout from this level to virtually six times as much began when bank deregulation.”

Categories: News

Links for 2010-09-01 [del.icio.us]

Thu, 09/02/2010 - 07:00
  • paper.li – read Twitter as a daily newspaper
    paper.li organizes links shared on Twitter into an easy to read newspaper-style format. Newspapers can be created for any Twitter user, list or #tag.
  • Infographic: The NewsScape - 8 sources of value creation in a post-channel media world - Trends in the Living Networks
    I have just prepared a framework to crystallize some of my thoughts on the news landscape today, which I've called The NewsScape. Individual channels - such as print, TV, internet, and more - are becoming meaningless. In the post-channel media world we are entering, the entire landscape is laid open. The NewsScape shows how value is created in this world.
  • Key trends in media and communications usage - Trends in the Living Networks
    Ofcom, UK's communications regulator, annually produces what is the most detailed study of the local communications marketplace available anywhere in the world. Every year it provides deep insights into many aspects of media and communications usage and the state of the industry, and Communications Market Report 2010 is another gem.
  • The 12 key elements of iPad media strategy - Trends in the Living Networks
    On August 27 in Sydney The Insight Exchange is running an iPad Strategy Workshop as part of the Newspaper Publishers Association Future Forum conference.
  • How to Exit the Age of Oil: Closing the Renewables Gap | Renewable Energy World
    We are living in a time when the theory of unlimited economic growth is running into the reality of limited energy sources. To solve the problem, it is commonly thought that renewables are simply a drop-in replacement for oil, gas and coal – but many experts are warning about the faultiness of that assumption.
  • Solving the Water-Energy Crisis | Renewable Energy World
    As demand for water increases, so too will demand on the energy system. Technologies like desalination require enormous amounts of fossil energies to process water. But burning more fossil resources exacerbates climate change, thus making water shortages more severe. And more severe water shortages mean that we'll need yet more fossil energies to process water. In this podcast, we'll look at how companies are implementing new technologies to lower the energy intensity of desalination, monitor water use, and create new ways of generating energy at wastewater treatment facilities and desalination plants.
  • Renewable Energy Podcast
    excellent series
  • Is Another Economics Possible? - NYTimes.com
    One could say, therefore, that another economics is now under way. Still, it seems fragmentary and incomplete and not yet adequate to the task of institutional design. We still don’t know how best to organize cooperative efforts or how to mobilize the capital necessary to support them on a large scale.
  • Towards a New Economy and a New Politics | Solutions
    The best hope for a new political dynamic is a fusion of those concerned about environment, social justice, and political democracy into one progressive force. A unified agenda would embrace a profound commitment to social justice and environmental protection, a sustained challenge to consumerism and commercialism and the lifestyles they offer, a healthy skepticism of growth-mania and a new look at what society should be striving to grow, a challenge to corporate dominance and a redefinition of the corporation and its goals, and a commitment to an array of major pro-democracy reforms.
  • Mass Customization Friday on Facebook at August 6 - Mass Customization & Open Innovation News
    20 startups in the mass customization space will advertise in a coordinated fashion on Friday (August 6) on Facebook to create awareness for design-your-own and customization.
  • Biens Communs — Commons — Bens comuns — Bienes comunes » ACTA: A new obstacle to human rights?
    This paper shows how the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement or ACTA have become the emblem of the maximum protection approach of intellectual property rights (IPR), reversing the public interest approach that underpinned IPR originally. It argues that if such a vision is realized, through ambiguous rhetoric and aggressive negotiating strategies, it could lead to a new international institutional framework that will hinder the realization of human rights.
  • Fab Camera - Open Innovation Projects
    A simple digital camera that can be easily created in a fablab, a hackerspace, etc in order to facilitate: * documentation of projects * machine vision for MTM * inspiration and creativity from nature, environment, things outside of fablabs
  • Open Moto X - Open Innovation Projects
    Open Moto X is a new TTXGP racing team developing electric motorcycles.
  • Self-replicating devices: the statistics - Erik's Blog: Discussing IT, personal fabrication and a new and better world
    One of the question of the RepRap survey was about when an operator had joined the community. The RepRap survey was an effort to learn about the adoption, creation and diffusion of innovations produced by user/developers. The study was done in conjunction with prof. Eric von Hippel (MIT Sloan School of Management, USA) and Jeroen de Jong (Erasmus University, EIM). The study is also a part of my master's thesis on the viability of the open source development model for physical objects, in other words, the future of Open Source Hardware.
  • A Structure of Customer Co-Creation: Special Issue in Swiss Marketing Journal - Mass Customization & Open Innovation News
    In the recent issue of Marketing Review, a German-language magazine on marketing practice, a number of brief articles are addressing open innovation with customers. In the lead article, Christoph Ihl and I are presenting our structure of different approaches of customer co-creation. "Co-creation" is the term I now frequently use to address the systematic integration of customers in the innovation process of a company.
Categories: News

Thesis: If computing is linked to the financial meltdown, then only a new computing regime can solve it

Wed, 09/01/2010 - 16:48

* Article: Computing and the Current Crisis: The Significant Role of New Information Technologies in Our Socio-Economic Meltdown David Hakken, tripleC, Vol. 8. No. 2, pp 205-220

David Hakken has written a very important essay, in a special issue of TripleC dedicated to the crisis, on how the present computing (and IP) regime, is linked to the current meltdown, and therefore, how only a new computing regime can solve the deep-seated issues that have led to it. In the article, David outlines these reasons, then shows how they are linked to both ‘asset unknowability’ and the hyper-restrictive IP regime. Only a new computing regime, based on FLOSS, can transform the causes of the crisis.

This is an original thesis, well argued in its analytical part, but need perhaps a stronger linkage in the ’solution’ part, i.e. how precisely is FLOSSing part of the new economic structure?

Go here for the full essay.

Abstract

“There is good reason to be concerned about the long-term implications of the current crisis for the reproduction of contemporary social formations. Thus there is an urgent need to understand it character, especially its distinctive features. This article identifies profound ambiguities in valuing assets as new and key economic features of this crisis, ambiguities traceable to the dominant, “computationalist” computing used to develop new financial instruments. After some preliminaries, the article identifies four specific ways in which computerization of finance is generative of crisis. It then demonstrates how computationalist computing is linked to other efforts to extend commodification based on the ideology of so-called “intellectual property” (IP). Several other accounts for the crisis are considered and then demonstrated to have less explanatory value. After considering how some commons-oriented (e.g., Free/Libre and/or Opening Source Software development projects) forms of computing also undermine the IP project, the article concludes with a brief discussion of what research on Socially Robust and Enduring Computing might contribute to fostering alternative, non-crisis generative ways to compute.”

Excerpts Part One: Analyzing the Problem

David Hakken:

“In my view, what is distinctive about the current crisis is new and significant ambiguities in valuation, the process by which particular cultural forms are assigned particular values, including but not only their values as commodities. Further, I think one kind of social practice – the way automated information and/or communication technologies have normally been used, or “computing” for short—is central to the creation of these ambiguities, that computing has played a key, insufficiently understood role in bringing them about. Thus, focusing on how we compute, and more generally, the role of technology in the crisis, provides a way to think more inclusively about it. Doing so broadens our focus, so we can attend to general changes in the dynamics of current social formation reproduction.

Thus, the articles’ central contentions are:

• That the co-occurrence of the crisis and a substantial increase in the degree to which human activity is computerized is indicative of a substantial (e.g., what used to be called a “causal” (Campbell, 2005)) connection between them;

• That the substantial connection between crisis and computing is likely rooted in financial entities computerized in the dominant “computationalist” manner, which in turn are the primary source of the ambiguities in valuation that give the current crisis its special character;

• That this unique feature of the current crisis is one facet of a more general intervention, several efforts to commodify a greater proportion of the reproductive dynamics of contemporary social formations (including the “invention” of “Intellectual Property” (IP)) rather than other facets of computing (e.g., web 2.0 or “playbor”) or of social formation reproduction (e.g., globalization) currently given much attention; and

• That the contemporaneous, widespread development of alternative ways to compute, such as Free/Libre and/or Open Source Software (FLOSS), exacerbate the current crisis while also modeling forms of computing which, being less generative of crisis, are worthy of additional study.

I argue that calling it a “computing-induced crisis” is justifiable in the registers used by contemporary social theorists to talk about social causation, that understanding how we currently compute is necessary in order to specifying the alternative computing practices needed to avoid similar crises in the future. The dynamics of social formation reproduction have changed, computing has much to do with the change, and the change is manifest in but not caused by new relationships among workers, managers, and consumers at the point of production. Rather, the new dynamic of crisis follows from implementation of a new way of conceptualizing the role of computing in the creation and sale of a range of new financial commodities. This new ideology of using computers to extend commodification fit with certain additional changes in, e.g., legal instrumentalities like “intellectual property.” While intended to aid the reproduction of capital, the new moves have (thus far) caused more problems that they have solved—i.e., have produced crisis.

Making this complex case definitively would require more than a single article. Here, I sketch out my argument, beginning with the reasons for seeing a connection between crisis and the dominant forms of computing as it was breaking. I then outline some alternative, non-computing-oriented accounts of the crisis and why I don’t find them as persuasive as a focus on computing. Next, I draw out the connection between computing’s dominant forms and attempts at a new property regime, showing how the failures of these forms and this regime are intimately connected to the crisis. I then explicate the paradoxical role of FLOSS, in both exposing flaws in the regime and furthering crisis. I conclude by discussing how to identify the different, more socially robust ways to compute that are required if we are not to experience this kind of crisis, or even more virulent varieties of it, repeatedly.”

Ways in which Computing Bears Responsibility for the Current Crisis

Stated positively and in broad-brush terms, I see four ways in which computing, especially a particular form of it that I call “computationalist” has played a central, generative role in the current crisis. I see these four forms as being sufficiently prior to the crisis in both logical and temporal senses to speak of them in a loose but still meaningful register (see footnote #3) as causative of the crisis.

They are:

1. Perhaps the most obvious crisis-generative aspect of computing is the profoundly instrumental role it played in the creation and marketing of a broad range of new financial instruments; that is, in new forms of financialization. “Financialization” of an economy occurs when a substantial proportion of capital realization takes place through the creation and sale of abstract monetary instruments, rather than through the production and sale of “real” (material) goods and services. Following Baran and Sweezy (1966), Foster and Magdoff (2009) make a convincing case that financialization has long been the chief strategy of late capitalism for fighting against the tendencies toward stagnation. Financialization has been evident in many capitalist economies since the 1970s; thus, the current crisis cannot follow from financialization in general. However, crisis does follow from the spread of particular, highly computer mediated financial instruments upon which the realization of profit became very dependent just prior to the outbreak of the current crisis. Instruments typical of the current form of financialization include those that garnered most public attention, the sub-prime mortgage-based securities created largely in the United States and marketed worldwide. Equally important to the crisis, I believe, were other computered commodities, including those collateralized in new forms of debt obligation (engineered by mixing several financial components into complex and largely opaque new entities, and similarly sold via new (international; see below) markets in securities), and parallel, equally nontransparent credit default swaps (essentially a financialized form of insurance).

2. Computing is heavily implicated in the emergence and trade of all these new commodities.

Given their complexity, none of them, nor markets in them, could have existed without it. Nor was computing’s role merely one of creating the possibility of doing such things. Only a few of the forms of financialization that were possible to computerize were actually developed (Tett 2009b). Those financial commodities that were developed and marketed were given the properties they had via what computer people call “affordances”—inclinations that, given existing preexisting developments or “path dependencies,” are likely to follow, unless action is taken to prevent them. Indeed, many of the AICTs that made these new commodities possible were developed precisely in order to create things like them. This path dependency was a consequence of the particular mix of the entrepreneurial and technical built into contemporary education in and the practice of computing. In short, to the extent that computing was essential to these commodities’ creation, and that market failures in these new financial commodities were central to the crisis, computing caused the crisis.

These computered financial instruments strongly afforded the elaboration of national markets for capital into a virtually global single market. Just as a desire for new commodities to trade in, so that more money could be made, drove computing development and implementation, so the development of international computing networks strongly incentivized creation of an unboundried market in capital. Indeed, the two go together; prospects for profitable trading in the new financial instruments were directly related to the extent to which the reach of the capital market could be scaled up.

However, this up-scaled market was formed without a simultaneously up-scaling of a parallel set of governance tools with which to regulate the trade carried out on it.

3. Less publicized but equally central to the generation of crisis were the widely adopted, computered models of the risks to sellers and buyers associated with trade in the new financial instruments. As the instruments were new, there was no “track record” of actuarial data on which to base judgments regarding the risks involved in buying, holding, and selling them. One consequence was major difficulties in pricing them, the implications of which exacerbated by the absence of forms of international governance in up-scaled markets.

Indeed, were it not for the development of complex, algorithm-based (computerized) risk assessment tools, trade in the new commodities, especially international, might well have remained marginal to capital realization. Moreover, the tools that were developed were based on presumptions like the idea that sufficiently detailed models would capture all relevant risk factors, as well as the notion that risk would follow the normal statistical distribution. As Gillian Tett demonstrates (2009b), these computer-based risk models were applied far beyond the intended applications of their initial developers. Presumed to be reliable, they became essentially the basis of price-setting models in the new financial instruments.

The arrival of crisis demonstrated these risk models were faulty. Numerous scholars and commentators, following Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), critiqued the models’ for their failure to incorporate the risk of the kind of general “systemic” failure that actually did occur.”

Asset Value Unknowability as the Core of the Current Crisis

“Asset value unknowability as the core of the current crisis:

In at least three additional important ways, the computerization of financial instruments led to a situation where assets’ values became ambiguous and increasingly unknowable.”

After giving 3 reasons for this, Hakken concludes:

“In short, a unique, perhaps the unique, characteristics of the current crisis is precisely these huge, persisting socio-economic spaces of unknowability. Given that a huge proportion of economic activity (Tett estimates some 80%) was financialized, this unknowability is lodged at the center of the reproduction of contemporary capitalist social formations.

The consequences of the lack of fit between the particular forms of computer-mediation of financial assets, on the one hand, and the wide swathes of unknowability to which their use led, on the other, have been amplified by the substantial upping of the scale (e.g., the “globalization” of markets in capital) at which some aspects of social formations (but not all) are able to be reproduced, further increasing the difficulty of establishing what specific value any given asset has. Indeed, it seems to me that the crisis will continue as long as a substantial body of difficult to evaluate assets persists. In sum, by 2008, many large social formations were in crisis. This crisis was a function of an economy highly mediated by a particular form of financialization (Tett, 2009a) which itself was afforded by a particular form of computing. The absence of any of the four ways outlined above in which computationalist computing afforded shaky financialization would have reduced the salience of the other two; all four seem central to a specific computing regime, a computing sociotechnological system in the sense of Thomas Hughes (2004), or a computing technology actor network in the Science, Technology, and Society language of Callon and Latour (1992). In the absence of such a computing regime, there may have been a crisis, but it would likely have taken a different, possibly less virulent form.”

How unknownability is linked to Intellectual Property

“At base, the unknowability of the new financial commodities is a consequence of the at base oxymoronic character of Intellectual Property. IP is an oxymoron in that, in order for the intellectual merit of, say, an idea, to be acknowledged and then valued on some quantitative scale of relative merit, it must first be communicated. However valuable I might consider my own ideas, there can be no compelling reason for another to share my evaluation without her first understanding them. For her to do this, I can’t keep them private; I have to say what they are. I can’t even get away with just saying what they are “like.” However, once communicated, it is difficult to control the understander’s use of the idea. Thus, any effort to turn ideas into private property faces a fiendish difficulty: how to keep control over things, like ideas or notions, that by their nature must be shared if they are to be evaluated. This problem is exacerbated by digitalization: once created, digital representations of ideas and notions are reproducible at extremely low cost (think of the cost to the writer of an email).”

Excerpts Part Two: The Solution

David Hakken:

“New, more socially robust forms of computing – deriving from, inter alia, what I call the strong program in social computing – not only must but can be developed and should be implemented as part of a crisis recovery/avoidance strategy. Fortunately, some computer practitioners – whom I like to call informists – have some good ideas about how to pursue socially robust and therefore enduring computing (SREC; Hakken, 2010), ideas incubated within the non-dominant forms of computing that have refused to reduce themselves to formalisms alone. The alternative practices are central to the Social Informatics within which I frame my research and that I teach at the new School of Informatics and Computing at Indiana University in the USA and at Trento University in Italy. Their ability to thrive, however, depends upon reinforcement of property regimes very different from IP and much more like the “commons” oriented regimes of FLOSS. Let us hope that commons-illuminative views, like those resulting in a Nobel Economics Prize for my Indiana University colleague Elinor Ostrom (e.g., 1990), come to provide a clear alternative orientation for professional computing.”

Categories: News

Eric Reasons: Value is not Capital

Wed, 09/01/2010 - 13:08

While the Internet’s disruption has made many a billionaire, it’s certainly well on it’s way to destroying some entire industries. And it seems to me, many of the institutions that are popping up to replace them don’t have the same capitalization, if they have capitalization at all. I know the Internet is adding Value, I just don’t know if it’s adding Value in a place where Capital can capture it.

Eric Reasons refines our understanding of the crisis of value, by distinguishing value from capital, and showing that new sectors can add value, while also decapitalize a sector.

He cites the music industry as an example:

“The industry is expanding, but capitalization is definitely shrinking. I know more people making a living from their music than ever before, but only because of a massive disruption of the music industry that has cost billions of dollars.

There are more players than ever getting their slice of the pie, but that pie is certainly shrinking (if the pie is measured in capital only). Lucky for them it was a really really big pie when it started to shrink.

The Internet added Value to the music industry, but it added it in a way that Capital couldn’t capture it. I see this a lot when the Internet disrupts some legacy industry.

What I’m really looking for is a way to measure the change in Value vs. the change in Capital. (But traditionally, we measure Value in terms of Capital!)”

Categories: News

Umair Haque: The Generation M consensus and the Forcorporations

Wed, 09/01/2010 - 12:19

Umair Haque thinks there is a Generation M Consensus — the growing consensus of a global movement dedicated to toppling the old order, by doing meaningful stuff that matters the most.

Here’s are the principles. The original article has links and a critique of the old order as well.

Of particular interest, his concept of forcorporations matches my argument about the ethical economy, published last week. At the bottom of this excerpt, I therefore add his earlier explanation of this concept.

1. The Generation M Consensus

* The Empty Vessel Rule.

“Government, Arthur Okun famously argued, is a leaky bucket — one which leaks money at every turn. Yet, though the government may be often a leaky bucket, the corporation is just as often an empty vessel: bereft of any purpose higher than profit. What the private sector offers in terms of efficiency, it subtracts in terms of virtue. So what we really need to do today isn’t merely to privatize what used to be public, or the reverse, nationalization. We need to meld the efficiency of the private sector with the virtues of the public sector — to pioneer the legal, financial, and contractual basis for new corporate forms, like forporations, that balance obligations to shareholders and the many kinds of stakeholders; that exist “for” a higher purpose than mere near-term profit.

* Shadow Tax Cuts.

Low taxes are the next item on the Washington Consensus’s agenda: nice, but not nearly good enough. Sure, sky-high taxes will kill prosperity dead. So what about the hidden taxes we all pay every second of every day? Consider. The fumes smogging up our skies are a tax. The junkfood lining the bleak exurban shelves is a tax. Most big-box stores are taxes sucking the life, heart, and soul out of town. Wall Street’s “innovations” turned out to be a tax. The hidden charges and unfair fees that constitute most “business models” are the epitome of a tax. Where the Washington Consensus ignores all these very real taxes just a little too conveniently, the M Consensus suggests it’s time to see them, face them, and eliminate them: steep enough shadow taxes will render all growth meaningless and illusory, because value has simply been extracted — not actually created.

* The Lessig Principle.

How? Here’s one way to counterbalance shadow taxes. Property rights, the next bullet point in the Washington Consensus’s agenda, are essential to growth — and so they’ve got to be enshrined, embraced, and extended. And have they ever been. The original term of copyright was, for example 14 years; today, it’s nearly ten times that: up to 120 years. Given that growth rate, by 2100, the copyright on this blog post will last for approximately 47 billion years. Yet, as Mike Masnick tirelessly points out , building on the work of scholars like Larry Lessig, draconian intellectual property rights regimes stifle innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruption, at the expense of protecting tired, lazy incumbents (here’s an eloquent explanation on why from Lewis Hyde). So where the Washington Consensus argues for a heavy, rigid approach to property rights, the M Consensus pushes for feather-light rights, knowing that the scarcer special privilege is, the more real value everyone’s likely to enjoy.

* The Porter Rule.

While IP rights, are of course, a form of regulation, the next item on the Washington Consensus’s agenda is deregulation in almost all other respects. A giant oil spill, an even more gigantic financial crisis, and an even more gigantic lost decade all evoke the dangers of a dogmatic devotion to deregulation. The M Consensus, instead, subscribes to Michael Porter’s path-breaking Porter Hypothesis: crudely put, that stricter regulation isn’t what stifles competitiveness — it can be exactly what induces it, by encouraging disruptive innovations to spark and catch fire.

* The People Principle.

Perhaps the biggest incentive we can give corporations to start getting serious about real innovation again, then, is what might be called humanization. The next item of the Washington Consensus’s moldy agenda is legally protecting the corporation. It’s been taken to an absurd extreme, with the doctrine that corporations must enjoy legal personhood. But (Earth to beancounters) corporations aren’t people — only people are people. The former face few of the obligations citizens do, can’t face the same kinds of punishments, are legally bound to maximize profit in ways that citizens aren’t, and tend to have thousands of times more cash, time, and power, which means they can afford to de facto buy rights almost no person on earth has (like hiring batteries of lawyers to fight cases for decades). Corporations, like hammers, are just tools. And for the same reason we don’t anthropomorphize hammers, nor should we empower corporations with the same rights and powers as people. Where the Washington Consensus humanizes corporations, and dehumanizes people, the M consensus suggests unhumanizing corporations, and rehumanizing people.

* The Uninterest Rate.

So where the last item in the Washington Consensus’s agenda is interest rates, set by markets, to knock governments, people, and communities into shape, the final item in the M Consensus’s agenda is what I call an uninterest rate: the rate at which income isn’t transformed into outcomes. It’s outcomes that count. Though we got a little bit richer, did we actually realize tangible, enduring benefits that mattered? Or did we just get more insecure, obese, unhappy, and disconnected? If the uninterest rate is high, it means income isn’t translating into outcomes; because our economy’s engines and engineers — corporations, CEOs, investors — are uninterested in making stuff that actually makes us better off; they’re just interested in making a quick buck. The higher the uninterest rate, the more corporations are likely to be knocked into shape — by fed-up people, communities, society, and investors alike. If it’s low, incomes equal better outcomes, and the mere paper wealth we may have earned actually matters in human terms.”

2. Towards Forcorporations

Umair Haque:

“Forporations. What, then, might amplify the signal of these new Detroits and Silicon Valleys? Let’s extend our historical analogy. Yesterday, Detroit, Madison Avenue, and Wall Street were powered by companies like…General Motors, General Foods, General Mills, and General Electric. Funny, isn’t it? But perhaps also telling: that’s “general” as in generic, commoditized, mass-made “product.” Today, we’re learning the hard way that “general” is, too often, the polar opposite of “meaningful.” So consider then, a radical idea: that the corporation as we know it just might be past its sell-by date, an obsolete tool that’s outlived its era.

Instead of creating new value, too many corporations merely transfer value from society to shareholders (consider, for a moment, the paradox of skyrocketing corporate profits versus record long-term joblessness, obesity, or carbon emissions). The problem isn’t, when you think about it, that corporations are dysfunctional. The problem is the very opposite: it’s that maximizing near-term profit, no matter what, is exactly what the modern corporation was made to do — and is bound to do.

Rebuilding our base of organizational capital means reinventing our most heavily utilized kind of organization, the corporation, to do bigger, better, more enduring things. How might we do it? By creating private-public partnerships to seed and invest new kinds of corporations. Consider the groundswell of states passing legislation for B corporations, a new kind of corporation which balances shareholder value and social returns, instead of prioritizing one over the other. Authentic prosperity depends on what I sometimes call “forporations”: more efficient, effective corporate forms “for” the pursuit of more meaningful, disruptive goals than just near-term financial gain; that exist “for” the benefit of more than just shareholders.”

Categories: News

Links for 2010-08-31 [del.icio.us]

Wed, 09/01/2010 - 07:00
Categories: News

How does the idea of p2p / commonism differ from the socialist tradition?

Tue, 08/31/2010 - 17:14

What is the connection between the historical tradition of socialism/communism and the contemporary emergence of ideas and practices centered around p2p dynamics and the commons?

1.

Let’s first tackle our understanding and interpretation of communism.

To me it is basically the idea, probably born at the same time as post-tribal class-based society, that an alternative human arrangement based on equal relationships and without the inheritance of wealth and privilege is possible. It is something that appears again and again in human history as an expression of those that are not privileged in the existing social arrangements.

A prominent example is of course the form of the Christian communities as described in the Act of the Apostles, but it is a recurring theme across history.

More importantly and recently, it became a driving idea of the labour movement that was born at the same time as industrial capitalism, and it would take various ideological and social forms, such as the utopian socialist experiments of the 19th century, the social-democratic labour movement that became dominant in Europe in the 20th century, the anarchist movements that flourished before WWII, etc …

Unfortunately, after the social revolution in Russia and its regression through isolation, it also became the ideology of a new ruling strata, which installed a new type of class society based on a managerial elite using state property, which used communism as an ideology to justify its oppression, much as the hierarchical and feudal Church would use the ideas of Christ to justify its own oppressive rule.

Today, the “idea” of communism is terminally contaminated with that historical experience of social oppression.

2.

What about peer to peer?

Peer to peer is born from the generalization of the human experience of voluntary aggregation using the internet.

It is the experience of creating digital commons of knowledge, code and designs, based largely on voluntary contributions, and on making these universally available, has re-introduced the reality of communal shareholding to wide strata of the population.

But is also the particular social expression of the new condition of work under cognitive capitalism, where workers, after the long hiatus of industrial capitalism where they were totally dispossessed of access to productive resources and machinery, could again access a productive resource under their control, through computers, the socialized network that was the internet.

This generalized the experience of social practices that are characterized by open and free input, participatory processes of production, and commons-oriented output.

From the contract between this strong experience of equality and liberty (equaliberty) and the trans-individuality of being connected through affinity, the desire naturally grows to extend this experience to other areas of life.

From this, social movements are emerging that seek to extend the reach of this human experience.

The P2P Foundation, and the P2P Theory that we are trying to develop, is merely one of the expressions of this general trend, but perhaps one of the more ambitious ones since it aims not just to a partial implementation of the new value system and social practice (as the free software or free culture movements would attempt), but to its generalization across the board.

3.

What then, are some of the important differences?

Peer to peer is not necessarily based on the belief of realizing a full classless society, but on the extension of an already existing social practice. Certainly for me, I would be extremely skeptical of any idea that such a society could be realized. Therefore peer to peer politics becomes a more pragmatic effort at extending the reach of this existence practice. This does not mean however, that I do not contemplate that this social logic may become the core of a new social order, but co-existing with a still differentiated class society. However, it is definitely an effort to create a more free, just, and equal world.

Peer to peer is not the expression of the industrial working class, but of the new forms of cognitive labour. But this does not mean it is restricted to full time cognitive workers, rather it is becoming part of the general human condition under cognitive capitalism, and therefore has the potential of becoming the culture and ideology of much wider social strata.

Peer to peer is therefore not a continuation of the socialist/communist tradition, but a re-elaboration of emancipatory practice and theory under new historical and social conditions. It’s a new start and reformulation, that is not bound by the previous historical tradition, though of course it is natural that new emancipatory efforts would look at historical precedents. Peer to peer is not related to socialism as a reformation of it, but is related to it in the same way as Christianity was related to the paganism of the Roman empire, i.e. as a trans-valuation of its major premises. Amongst other things, this frees us from the incessant bickering of left-wing cults.

This of course does not mean that peer to peer can be entirely divorced from the previous historical context, but it is not beholden to it as a continuation of the same tradition.

4.

What about the commons?

It is around the issue of the commons that the differences with the previous emancipatory tradition comes to the fore.

The labour movement became historically associated with the effort to increase the reach of public and state property, and the idea of regulation (social democracy) or planning of the economy (Marxism).

Peer to peer and the commons are about the direct value creation through civil society, and are about new forms of governance and property that apply directly to civil society groups creating this value. The forms of property advocated are not based on private exclusionary property, but also not on an alienation of property through the state. The commons are a form of property where individuals remain direct‘shareholders’, they are not expropriated from their contributions to the value creation, neither by the state nor private corporations. The individual and his/her property does not ‘disappear’ in the collective as represented by the state.

The commons, not the state, becomes the core institution of the new political economy. Both digital and material commons have their own institutional formats, the latter managed by democratically governed trusts.

The p2p/commons approach does not abolish private property, but limits its reach and subsumes it as an auxiliary form for the allocation of rival goods, while also drastically reforming the formats of such private ownership, away from the formats which deny any consideration of social and environmental externalities.

The p2p/commons approach does neither abolish the state nor makes it the sole proprietor in charge of central planning, but limits the role of the state as a institution for the meta-governance of the common good, looking at the equilibrium between public functions, the commons and civil society, and private entrepreneurs. The new Partner State becomes the guarantor of the new commons-based peer production, until that time as it can hypothetically ‘whither away’ as more and more of its functions are taken over by an increasingly egalitarian and autonomous civil society. But, we are not holding our breath that this process can take place in historically close times. However, we do believe that the necessary phase-transition is merely a few decades away, as the urgency of biospheric destruction and social dislocation does not permit the long-range survival of the present destructive social arrangements.

5.

What about p2p/commons as a political approach?

The p2p/commons approach and the social forces representing it, does not seek to replace the labour movement, or other emancipatory political groups, but allies itself with all those protecting the common natural heritage of mankind, and a more just redistribution of social value.

Hence the idea of the triarchical alliance for the commons, consisting of those

- Directly fighting for free culture and the commons
- Directly fighting for the protection of the biosphere
- Directly fighting for social justice

Categories: News

Is our civilization in free fall?

Tue, 08/31/2010 - 08:48

Richard Hames has a long essay on why our system is not addressing its systemic challenges, given a number of intergrated psycho-cultural causes.

Here’s the intro, but go to the full article for the detailed treatent of the individual causes.

Richard David Hames:

“During the coming decade we are likely to face a cascade of massively disruptive crises that will feed on each other both economically and ecologically. Many of these will disable institutional power players, potentially opening up space for new socioeconomic, governance and technological innovations to embed. As that happens, collaboration on an unprecedented scale will be needed to transition the human community into one that is at once more viable, resilient and benign to life.

In that regard it is useful to distinguish between two scenarios articulated by my friend Michel Bauwens. The first presupposes enlightened leadership from at least a fraction of the political and business elite. This is difficult because it requires a level of consciousness and individual altruism able to rise above perceived self-interests. The second focuses attention on local resilience but accomplished in ways where the resulting innovation flows are accessible universally – for example through open source design and peer-to-peer communities. Elements of both scenarios are critical to success. Both must be framed within different logics of possibility and desirability.

There appear to be five factors currently hampering civilizational renewal. They have nothing to do with technology, infrastructure and investment capital, and very little to do with politics. In fact all five of these factors are relatively intangible. What they do have in common is an affiliation to the cultural or psychological space within which we typically respond to shifting and uncertain conditions.

Very simply stated these factors are (i) the detachment of ideas and social relations; (ii) fears and apprehension, engendered through an apparent lack of control as well as a distrust of others motives; (iii) outdated and invalid mindsets; (iv) competitive conduct; and (v) the fragmentation of endeavours.”

Let us examine each of these in turn.

Categories: News

Links for 2010-08-30 [del.icio.us]

Tue, 08/31/2010 - 07:00
  • Videos tagged 'dividendeuniversel' on Vimeo
  • Dividende Universel - Wikipédia
    Le Dividende Universel est un système de création monétaire, qui défend le principe que chaque citoyen d'une zone monétaire est co-propriétaire de cette zone, comme d'une entreprise, et que de ce fait, il est en droit de participer à la création monétaire sous la forme d'un dividende régulier versé sur la base d'un pourcentage de la masse monétaire totale de la zone économique répartie entre tous les citoyens de façon parfaitement égale et symétrique.
  • https://nouvellesociete.wordpress.com/
  • Jean Zin #solidarite#solidarite#solidarite
    one of the best french social political thinkers
  • L'abeille et l'économiste - Jean Zin
    C'est un livre important et très étonnant, surtout dans le contexte actuel, en ce qu'il commence par célébrer le triomphe de la finance, contre l'évidence du présent désastre, mais l'insistance sur sa fabuleuse puissance de création de richesses dans une économie cognitive lui permet de conclure, dans les dernières pages, que c'est donc la finance qu'il faut taxer. La taxation de toutes les transactions bancaires est ici le coeur de la sortie de crise pour le capitalisme cognitif, couplé avec un revenu d'existence, revenu minimum qui peut se cumuler avec un travail. A cela, il faudrait joindre une comptabilité écologique des externalités et une relative extinction de l'Etat qui laisse la plus grande part aux marchés et aux ONG...
  • La transition énergétique - Jean Zin
    On n'a rien vu encore. La crise économique s'aggrave en devenant crise politique mais ce n'est pas notre seul problème, ni peut-être le pire car la crise énergétique va rapidement revenir sur le devant de la scène. En effet, le pic de la production pétrolière pourrait bien être atteint en 2014. Oui, dans 4 ans seulement, vous avez bien lu ! Ces annonces sont toujours sujettes à caution, très dépendantes du niveau des cours, mais justement la retombée de ce qu'on a pris pour une bulle du pétrole (à l'origine de l'écroulement financier) a découragé des investissements qui auraient pu exploiter d'autres sources et, c'est un fait, les capacités actuelles sont à leur maximum.
  • Transversales - Sciences & culture
    "Locales", "sociales", "solidaires", "virtuelles", "libres", "affectées", "complémentaires", "alternatives", "plurielles"... une floraison de qualificatifs parcourt cette nouvelle lettre de Transversales Science Culture, consacrée aux monnaies non officielles, c’est-à-dire à celles autres que nationales (ou européenne).
  • Tikkun Daily Blog » Blog Archive » Elemental: Why We are All Pagan
    “We’ll honor the elements.” A feature of most contemporary pagan rituals. “We all have to breathe. We all need light and warmth. We all stand on the earth that feeds and shelters us. We all need water to stay alive, whatever else we believe or don’t believe.” The word pagan simply means country dweller, though many contemporary neo-pagans are urban dwellers as were many pagans in classical times.
  • with alex giordano, rafael mauro, adam arviddson
  • Habemus data. cultura digitale e informazione libera - Teresa De Feo
  • Custom make electronic products online with Ponoko « Ponoko – Blog
    Ponoko has teamed up with SparkFun Electronics to help make it easy for you to build custom electronics products using your online personal factory.
  • Selbstorga-Wiki
    Du befindest dich im Autoorganisations-Wiki, einer Sammlung zu Projekten und Ideen rund um Selbstorganisation und die damit verbundenen Vorstellungen einer anderen Welt – ohne Lohnarbeit und andere von Zwang geprägte Umgangsweisen miteinander.
  • amor mundi: Futurology Against Ecology
  • amor mundi: Vandana Shiva on Resource Descent and Permaculture Politics
    Advocating for appropriate technology is not "anti-technology," directing our attention to politically pernicious deployments of technodevelopment exploiting the vulnerable and profiting elite-incumbents is not "anti-technology," delineating the catastrophic impacts of false models and marketing hype is not "anti-technology." As I keep on insisting, time and time again, "technology" doesn't exist at a level of generality that properly enables one to affirm a "pro-technology" or "anti-technology" stance in any kind of monolithic way.
  • P2P Foundation » Blog Archive » The importance of invisible architectures for generating collective wisdom
    Individuals, no matter how highly developed, will not be able to embrace and respond to the challenges humanity is currently facing. It seems now that evolution is seeking the emergence of global wisdom-driven organizations. It is now time for collective Bodhisattvas to emerge.
Categories: News

Data Roads: turning Internet routing upside-down

Tue, 08/31/2010 - 06:56

Jared Hardy’s DataRoads Foundation advocates a radical change in how data are routed on the internet. Instead of a central naming system, Hardy says, we could have user-centric addresses which, combined with a geographic component, could do the job as well as or even better than today’s global IP numbers. The concept is explained in a post titled ‘When Global Agreements Aren’t Necessary’.

In another post – ‘Flipping The Internet Upside-Down’ – the revolutionary impact of such a new addressing and routing system becomes clear. Hardy says we need “a new, bottom-up, “first mile” version of the Internet. This new vision for the Internet can exploit these existing institutions, yet it does not require any of them. I think we can build something even better than Network Neutrality into this new design. Instead, we can build a people-centered network.”

He’s also made an illustration that shows how the net will change. It depicts the internet of today, where we depend on content providers and access providers and shows, in the bottom half of the design, what the relative importances will be in a future net where we the users are the owners of that last mile and its immediate connectivity.

Hardy also says we shouldn’t be talking about lines and pipes when describing the internet. The terminology should be that of a network of nodes that talk to each other. Roads would be a great analogy.

“The top-down nature of the Internet today is reflected and enforced by the analogies we use. Network connections are not like “pipes,” where resources come down from some central reservoir. They are not like electrical “lines” either, where energy is created and distributed from a set of far-away generation plants. Modern networks aren’t even like old telephone connections, where some central switching-station routes all regional calls.”

“IP packet networks are much more like the “roads” we navigate every day. Everyone should be able to have a driveway connection from their personal property onto the shared road system. Everyone can provide their own “vehicle” (device) for utilizing these roads. Every “trip” has a unique start and destination. Vehicles obey regulatory requirements, and drivers obey the rules of the road, yet everyone is considered to be “free” in their travel plans and methods.”

“Data roads have parallels to transportation roads, but are much more flexible.”

To get a more detailed view of this new conception of the net, please go see the DataRoads Foundation website.

Categories: News

Why the World Needs WikiLeaks

Mon, 08/30/2010 - 14:15

Via Open Culture:

“Above, we have TED’s Chris Anderson interviewing Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, the whistle-blowing website that made headlines last month when it released the Afghan War Diaries, all 92,000 pages worth. During the 19 minute interview, Assange talks a little more about the philosophy behind WikiLeaks, how the organization decides when to release information (or not), how the site has changed world events, and what some more ordinary leaks look like. No matter what stance you take on WikiLeaks, the interview is worth a watch. You’ll only hear more about them down the line.”

Two important updates from John Robb:

- an analysis of Wikileaks as an open source insurgency

- the rape charge as disinformation campaign

Video:

Categories: News

FLOSS as a Commons

Mon, 08/30/2010 - 10:18

A text by David Bollier:

“FLOSS as Commons: What is the way, what are the actions for having FLOSS acknowledged globally as a strategic and crucial common for knowledge society? Is FLOSS paving the way for bigger initiatives and larger variety of commons?

Even though FLOSS has generated countless high-quality software programs, public recognition of FLOSS as a powerful alternative mode of value-creation – functioning outside of the marketplace, yet in constructive symbiosis with it – has lagged. Similarly, the deep affinities between FLOSS and other forms of online collaboration are not readily recognized by economic theorists, public policymakers and the general public. They tend to see communities of online collaboration either as interesting novelties having no larger theoretical significance or as “open business models” that happen to rely upon the social relationships of users (e.g., “user-generated content” and “social networking”).

FLOSS and Web 2.0 innovations, however, are based on socially created value, and they constitute a distinct paradigm of economic and cultural production. This paradigm needs to be recognized and honored as a powerful generative force in its own right.

One way to advance this understanding is to conceptualize FLOSS and other collaborative endeavors as commons. The language of the commons can help validate the distinctive social dynamics of online sharing and collaboration and generalize them as significant forces in economic and cultural production. This can help popularize the idea that FLOSS and digital collaboration more generally are critical forces in the global knowledge society.

Without such a language of the commons, market metrics and discourse tend to prevail. This is fine as far as it goes. But the conventional market narrative provides a misleading ontology and epistemology for describing FLOSS communities. Market discourse focuses on “rational” individuals seeking to maximize their material self-interest and “utility”; profit and capital accumulation are seen as the preeminent goals.

FLOSS and other commons, however, are based on a more expansive set of personal and social goals; material self-interest is not the paramount or exclusive goal. Creative freedom and political autonomy, not to mention social camaraderie, reputation-building and the sheer pleasure of collaboration, tend to be the animating attributes of digital commons.

FLOSS has its own special governance systems and social ethic to manage its shared resource (intangible software code). But there are many related types of digital communities – wikis, web archives, social networking sites, remix and mashup communities, open access publishing, eclectic pools of Creative Commons-licensed material, etc. – that have their own systems for protecting their work, organizing their participants, disciplining vandals, etc.

It helps to see these diversified “digital tribes” as part of the same, larger phenomenon – the Commons Sector. Collectively, collaborative communities represent a significant non-market mode of productive capacity. FLOSS has also shown that it is entirely possible to conjoin the interests of a commons with those of the market, provided that the rules and ethic for monetizing the fruits of the commons respect the integrity of the community of practice.

There are a number of significant works exploring the nature of collaborative creativity (Yochai Benkler, Clay Shirky, Jonathan Zittrain, Lawerence Lessig, Mathieu O’Neil), as well as studies about the functioning of FLOSS in particular (Samir Chopra and Scott D. Dexter, Steve Weber, Eben Moglen, the Free Software Foundation). Notwithstanding many academic studies, we do not yet have a shared conceptual framework or popular language for describing the serious work performed by open, collaborative communities on the Internet.

For example, we have not adequately explored the governance and sociology of self-organized, online communities. We need richer analytic models for explaining why digital commons are generative; what rules and social norms are critical to their functioning and continuity; what types of activity are (and are not) amenable to open collaboration; and what governance structures may be necessary to enable commoners to manage and preserve their shared assets (code, information, photos, creative works, etc.) while still engaging with markets.

The discourse and literature of the commons can help address these issues. They can also help situate FLOSS in a larger digital and cultural context. And they can more accurately describe the on-the-ground social dynamics of FLOSS communities than market theory.

The commons discourse has been steadily gaining ground over the past two decades, thanks in part to the pioneering work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her studies of the governance of “common pool resources.” Commons analysis has been elaborated and extended by natural resource scholars associated with the International Association for the Study of Commons; theorists such as law professors Lawrence Lessig, Yochai Benkler and James Boyle; and by activists such as Silke Helfrich, Michel Bauwens, Philippe Aigrain and myself, among many others.

What has emerged over the past ten years in particular is a rich contemporary vocabulary for thinking about the management of shared resources – a perspective that eludes conventional economists and market-based policymakers.

FLOSS has been a key inspiration for much of the commons literature because it is such a relatively pure embodiment of the basic principles of the commons. Through the General Public License and open-source licenses, communities of programmers are able to generate valuable shared code, assure their ability to share and improve the code, and most importantly, prevent its private appropriation. FLOSS communities have solved many of the recurrent problems that afflict commons, such as how to preserve the commons (resource, community and social values) over time and how to prevent the appropriation or abuse of a common resource.

The FLOSS social-production ethic is so admired that the term “open source” has become a universal cultural signifier for initiatives that honor bottom-up innovation, participation, collaboration, transparency and community accountability. Unfortunately, “free software” and “open source” are also seen as arcane, complicated technical fields. This deters the public and policymakers from exploring the substantive dynamics of FLOSS – and in any case, the specific governance schemes for FLOSS projects are likely to differ from those of Wikipedia, the DailyKos, the Internet Archive and various “content commons.”

The language of the commons provides a rigorous framework for considering diverse collaborative communities in a single landscape. It offers a powerful way to identify and legitimize them by showcasing their reliance on socially created value. By seeing itself as the “anchor tenant” of the Commons Sector – and not as a standalone enterprise that is a junior partner to the marketplace or a peripheral player in the democratic polity – FLOSS can assert a stronger solidarity with the many worthy commons initiatives now emerging.

It can also fortify democracy and the market economy by showing that the FLOSS ethic of participation, transparency, accountability and performance is not an aberration; its values and practices are broadly shared by a diversified and growing Commons Sector. One of the key challenges facing FLOSS – and online communities more generally – is finding new ways to amplify this sensibility by federating and coordinating the energies of the digital commoners.”

Categories: News

Dale Carrico on libertarianism, redux

Mon, 08/30/2010 - 07:25

Excerpted from Dale Carrico’s longer comment on our previous extract here:

“The unifying thread between the two parts is a critique of the metaphor of “spontaneous order” which figures so prominently in the arguments of so many techno-centric commentators to this day, from both the right (which, contra many of its proponents, is where I properly locate the politics of market libertarian ideology) and the left, enabling in endless variations what amount to superficially anti-political arguments most of which typically function to support elite-incumbent politics in substance. Although the re-posted piece is a rather old one, it seems to me that a lazy recourse to such spontaneist and anarchist figurations has gotten no better in recent years, and fatally suffuses quite a lot of otherwise indispensable work on p2p-networks, activism, net neutrality (so-called), and more general discourse on online sociality, creative expressivity, organization.

It is crucial to remember that every norm, custom, pricing convention, institution, subcultural trait, architectural feature, however monolithic, stubborn, inertial it may seem is a product of historical struggle, that things have been otherwise, things could be otherwise, things surely will be otherwise, and at least part of what politics means is the collective contestations and collaborations that yield the vicissitudes in the career of apparently only natural, that is to say, naturalized conventions. If it makes sense to say such a thing, then it follows that there is always a politics in the declaration that some actually-contingent outcome is not political, is beyond contestation, is natural, neutral, technical, autonomous… there is a politics of the de-politicizing gesture, the taking off from the table that which could be otherwise.

For one thing: That this is a gesture that will tend to the benefit of incumbency — the acceptance as natural, inevitable that which is given in the status quo, deserves special note.

For another thing: Also deserving such note is that technoscience has no politics (in making this point I leave to the side the ethnography of political strife in lab settings, funding battles, publication histories, figuration of paradigm shifts, marketing appropriations, and so on), that is to say that the warranted descriptions arising from consensus science have no inevitable politics but are nonetheless always only deployed in the world according to the different politics of those who take them up. This makes technodevelopmental questions particularly susceptible to facile determinisms, autonomisms, reductionisms, technocratic elitisms premised on such de-politicizing naturalizations of the play of their changes in history.

I am personally very interested in what I describe as p2p-democratization, the taking up of p2p-formations within the normative, legal, institutional context of reasonably representative democratic-identified societies by those who would educate, agitate, and organize for more equitable, consensual, diverse, convivial political outcomes and culture.

It is crucial to grasp that these efforts do not in my view express an underlying ethos of p2p-interaction or e2e network architecture, but represent historically specific, politically opportunistic, ethically mandated efforts that should be documented, facilitated, celebrated (just because my own politics are of the democratic consensualist left, devoted to equity-in-diversity), but which are far from inevitable, natural, more structurally “apt” to the forces at hand than antithetical elite-incumbent or authoritarian deployments also afoot in this changing landscape.

Crucial to ensuring that democratizing and consensualizing deployments of p2p-formations prevail is an awareness, in my view, not only of the actual contingency and artificiality of democracy and the scene of consent, but a better understanding of what is conceptually unique to the spheres of the ethical and the political in which these struggles and outcomes make their way and make their home. That is why I am very pleased that Michel has also re-posted here several texts in which I take up these issues very specifically, among them recently Peer to Peer Democracy and the State and older pieces like Defining Left and Right and Democratizing the State Rather Than Smashing It.

Given that the democratic state is rightly imagined to be a space facilitating the non-violent adjudication of inevitable disputes (including fraught disputes about what should count as violence and non-violence), a space in which the diversity of peers who share the world can come together despite their differences, and none get left behind for good, it is important to grasp how different such a role and such a space is in its legitimacy from “optimal outcomes” presumably yielded by comparative advantage, positional advantage, competitive advantage and the other mechanisms that figure so prominently in so many non-political (technocratic and determinist) and anti-political (spontaneist and libertopian) delineations of the organizational terrain of p2p-formations.

Needless to say, actually-existing democracies relentlessly fail to live up to their guiding ideals, but there is all the difference in the world between those who respond to this failure by relinquishing the ideal of civitas altogether and those who are spurred to reform what actually-exists in the direction of those ideas (reforms in which p2p-democratization figures centrally, hopefully, in this moment, in my view). But worse than resignation to inertial pull of incumbency and authoritarianism and the cynical or interested relinquishment of democratization and consensualization in my view, is the widespread ignorance of the distinctive substance and promise of democracy and consent as political phenomena and hence the blindness to and heedless loss of both among good-intentioned people who should know better but simply don’t because we are so abysmally uninformed and misinformed about political matters on which our worldly lives nonetheless depend for our survival and flourishing.

By way of conclusion, I am interested that though Mr. Carson affirms that he differs from my assessment of market libertarian ideology (as I already happen to know many scores of people obviously do), he actually doesn’t say much as to why he does or respond to any of the points I made in the piece at hand, which leaves me bereft of his reasoning from which I am sure I and others would benefit enormously. “

Categories: News

Links for 2010-08-29 [del.icio.us]

Mon, 08/30/2010 - 07:00
Categories: News

Documentary: “A new we”, on ecovillages in Europe

Sun, 08/29/2010 - 13:37

The Austrian documentary filmmaker Stefan Wolf traveled for ten months through Europe in order to explore well established eco-communities and to present a broad spectrum of lifestyle possibilities to many people. Experience ecovillaged and ecological communities in Europe in this two hour long documentary portrait

Video:

Categories: News

Alan Rosenblith on Fractal Sovereignty

Sun, 08/29/2010 - 10:11

fractal sovereignty is where the sovereignty of the individual and the sovereignty of the group are simultaneously fully embraced.

Excerpt from Alan Rosenblith:

“The question about where to place sovereignty has long been one of the core divides in politics. Many who consider themselves conservative favor the sovereignty of the individual over the group, decrying regulations, taxes, etc. Those who may consider themselves liberal tend to believe that taxes are a good thing because they contribute to the common good. In the spirit of “transcend and include” we have been exploring what it would mean to embrace both types of sovereignty fully. And, as is the case with many other topics, the MetaCurrency people don’t all agree. But here are my thoughts.

Fractals are all over the place in nature. Consider a snowflake. Its hypnotizing symmetry is a direct result of the “V” shape of a water molecule. A water molecule is bent at a very specific angle, causing it to be polar. This means one side is positively charged and the other is negatively charged. The collective interaction of billions of these tiny polar molecules is what ultimately leads to the snowflake’s macro crystalline structure. So the larger scale pattern emerges fractally from the smaller scale pattern.

Now apply this to sovereignty. For a group to be truly sovereign as a group, the only possible foundation is full individual sovereignty. So what do I mean by full individual sovereignty? In this case I don’t simply mean that you have a vote. I mean you are fully sovereign to act however you deem best given the information you have. That last part about information is really the key.

As you may already be aware, I consider a currency a method of keeping account of things that happen in the real world. It doesn’t take a big leap to see that my perception of the world largely depends on how I account for events. If I am a teacher who cares how polite the kids are with each other, I might want to keep track of pleases and thank yous. Perhaps I would choose to use a gold star system. If I care about academic performance I would use grades. If I care about athletic performance, I would keep score. All of these are currencies that shape my perception of the students in my class.

When we share methods of accounting, we can better coordinate our actions. For example, it wouldn’t be much of a football game if half the team was paying attention to the score, and the other half was counting the pleases and thank yous on the field. Coherence in the game emerges from shared perception of the events taking place on the field, and our perception emerges from how we account for these events.

So far, so good. But how does this apply to sovereignty? In the Industrial paradigm, we tend to get to cohesion through coercion. There are rules that are usually dictated from on high. Even in a democracy, how much say do you really have over the rules? Not much. What if instead of relying on RULES to create social cohesion, we let cohesion emerge from everyone’s fully sovereign individual actions. Everyone would be fully sovereign to use whatever method of accounting for events they found most useful. In other words, everyone would be fully sovereign to choose how to perceive the world around them. I predict that ultimately, this would produce large scale social coherence without coercion, much like how water molecules produce the coherence of the snowflake without any coercion or rules.

That is the soft claim. The strong claim is that true group sovereignty has as a necessary logical underpinning full individual sovereignty. Groups that cohere otherwise are not actually sovereign in the sense of choosing how to respond to their environment AS A GROUP. Sure they can respond, but not as sovereign entities. They respond based on rules and policies formalized on paper.

Think of it this way. In nature, species exist BECAUSE they work. No one sat down and looked at the ecosystem and said, “You know, I think a small hairy critter would do well here.” If there are small hairy critters, it is because small hairy critters emerged. Similarly, groups that are truly sovereign will exist BECAUSE they work, not because they were designed ahead of time. That is the essence of emergence versus creation from outside.”

Categories: News

An update on the SolaRoof project

Sun, 08/29/2010 - 10:05

Update via the SolaRoofGuy:

“Eric, I appreciate your update on the Open Structure development.

I would like to update you about SolaRoof, which is still progressing – but slowly – as an OpenSource technology under our Creative Commons Public License.

Our approach is to identify activity such as: DIY, education, research and humanitarian use of SolaRoof to be non-commercial use, which is accorded FREE access and use under conditions of Attribution and Share-Alike. The commercial use of our technology additionally calls for a PayItForward commitment for support of humanitarian projects. Our reserve on commercial use rights is intended to generate support from the commercial sector, especially those in the industrialized world, that will assist the projects initiated by our DIY community in poor communities and “emerging economies” where SolaRoof can strengthen the capacity for sustainable living.

The PayItForward commitment has also been called an Honor Payment, since it is an ethical obligation rather than a legal obligation for the commercial users. Non-commercial users are also encouraged to cooperate to establish PayItForward projects. My new initiative to mobilize the power of global collaboration and cooperation is called DIYFood. I am launching the DIYFood Campaign on 10/10/10, which is a day for Work Parties to present grassroots solutions for Global Warming that has been organized by 350.ORG. I anticipate that we will showcase several DIYFood projects on the launch date and the campaign is to mobilize commitments to establish 350 DIYFood projects (by DIYers) before this year-end.

SolaRoof structural systems for DIY are very accessible and low-tech, but do encourage use of advanced materials technology. SolaRoof DIY uses commodity materials that can be used “off-the-shelf” or fabricated with hand or small power tools. The base structure system for backyard solar greenhouse construction in America or Europe is light aluminum angle and flat bar. The covering material is polyfilm or polyfabric. Mechanical systems use components from other consumer market sectors – the swimming pool and heat pump components or if DC power is preferred then from automotive and boating parts supply.

The key idea that makes SolaRoof a viral factor that will be big with DIY is that our methods for solar energy capture and use are incredibly low cost and simple and now SolaRoof will establish with DIYFood a more accessible and documented package of knowhow that will enable a wide spread use of specific successful patterns of construction (modularity) so that we will see rapid replication and diffusion of DIYFood methods (tunnel greenhouses) everywhere. I am looking for maximum impact and global PR for DIYFood on the launch date of 10/10/10 and ask you and anyone who is excited about DIY hacks for the big items – shelter, controlled environment, food, water, energy – that will make a difference if they go viral to get involved.

From this date to our 11/11/11 date – the Eleventh Hour campaign – we would like to see DIYFood go viral and build up a huge community of global collaboration and cooperative enterprise network.”

Categories: News

Is network theory the ideology of Empire?

Sat, 08/28/2010 - 17:42

Excerpted form Micah White’s article on the birth of the altermodern, this is summary of Zizek’s critique of network ideology as complicit in neocapitalist efforts:

“According to Slavoj Žižek in the final chapter of his book Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences, the exemplars of Deleuzian philosophy are not the anarchists but the late-capitalists: “In short, and stated even more pointedly, the thought of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, the ultimate philosophers of resistance, of marginal positions crushed by the hegemonic power network, is effectively the ideology of the newly emerging ruling class.” For Žižek, the misapprehension of Deleuze as a philosopher of resistance has led to the awkward situation where major alterglobalization theorists are espousing a suspiciously similar rhetoric to that of the globalizers. Singling out Naomi Klein, Žižek continues, “So, when Naomi Klein writes that ‘[n]eo-liberal economics is biased at every level toward centralization, consolidations, homogenization. It is a war waged on diversity,’ is she not focusing on a figure of capitalism whose days are numbered? Would she not be applauded by contemporary capitalist modernizers? Is not the latest trend in corporate management itself ‘diversify, devolve power, try to mobilize local creativity and self-organization?’ Is not anticentralization the topic of the ‘new’ digitalized capitalism?”

The significance of Žižek’s stinging critique of Klein is that it effectively tars an entire lineage of leftist political theory leading from Deleuzian multiplicities to Hardt and Negri’s multitude. And in light of there having been no compelling response to Žižek’s critique, it is hard not to doubt the postmodern tactics we’ve been using. Could it be that while we’ve been smashing boundaries and crossing borders, consumerism has quickened its global expansion by piggybacking on our identity-blurring efforts?”

Categories: News